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VOL. XVI, No. 7

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1922

WHOLE No. 430

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The Classical Weekly

VOL. XVI, No. 7

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1922

WHOLE NO. 430

HELPS TO THE STUDY OF THE METAMORPHOSES OF OVID

(Continued from pages 27, 34, 42)

III. ANNOTATED EDITIONS OF THE METAMORPHOSES

1. German Editions

Haupt, Moritz. *Die Metamorphosen des P. Ovidius Naso, I-VII²*, by Müller, H. J. (Weidmann, Berlin, 1885).

There are very many excellent notes in this edition, especially those that deal with Ovid's language, and with the mythology.

Korn, Otto. *Die Metamorphosen des P. Ovidius Naso, VIII-XV³*, by Ehwald, R. (Weidmann, Berlin, 1898).

This is the second part of the edition begun originally by Haupt. The notes on the mythology are as good as those in Müller's version of Haupt, perhaps even better. In addition, excellent summaries are prefixed to the various books.

Siebelis, Johannes. *P. Ovidii Nasonis Metamorphoses: Auswahl für Schulen* (Teubner, Leipzig). Books I-IX reached a fifteenth edition, by Polle, Friedrich, in 1892; Books X-XV reached a twelfth edition, also by Polle, in 1888. An admirable and extensive selection of stories is given; the notes are clear and good.

2. American Editions

I shall put down now, in alphabetical sequence, the names of the American editions of the *Metamorphoses* known to me, with some indication of their contents. I shall not, however, attempt to differentiate them on the score of merit. A somewhat particular account of their contents will be given, that each reader may judge of their adaptability to his individual needs.

Allen, J. H., and W. F., and Greenough, J. B., revised by Fowler, Harold N. *Selections from Ovid, Chiefly the Metamorphoses*. (Ginn and Company, Boston, 1890).

Contents: The Life of Ovid, v-vi; Writings of Ovid, vii; Introduction to the "*Metamorphoses*" of Ovid, xv-xxii; Text, 1-205; Met. 1.89-415 <1.1-88 are relegated to an Appendix, pages 202-205, with explanatory notes at the bottom of the page: Professor Fowler regards them as too difficult for the beginner, and as without interest for such students>, 452-567, 2.1-400, 760-796, 833-875, 3.1-137, 138-252, 4. 55-166, 432-542, 615-803, 5.341-661, 6.1-145, 165-312, 7.1-293, 294-353, 614-657, 8.152-546, 620-724, 9.134-272, 10.1-77, 86-219, 560-680, 11.1-193, 583-748, 12.1-145, 13.750-897, 14.772-828, 15.622-744, 745-879, Selections from

the *Fasti*, *Heroides*, *Amores*, *Tristia*, and *Epistulae Ex Ponto* (170-201); Notes, 3-153 <3-6 deal with the verse of Ovid>; Vocabulary, 1-168.

Anderson, James N. *Selections from Ovid*. (D. C. Heath and Company, Boston and New York, 1899).

Contents: Ovid's Life and Works, v-viii; The Meters of Ovid, viii-x; Text, 1-86; Met. 1.89-150, 262-415, 2.1-328, 680-706, 3.582-691, 4.55-166, 631-662, 5.385-571, 8.183-235, 626-720, 10.1-77, 11.85-145, 12.612-628, 13.1-298, 15.746-860, 871-879, Selections from *Heroides*, *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, *Remedia Amoris*, *Tristia*, Proverbs and Short Selections (pages 76-86); Commentary, 87-176; Appendix, Notes on the More Difficult Passages, 177-178; Vocabulary, 179-258.

Bain, Charles Wesley. *The Poems of Ovid: Selections*. (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907).

Contents: Life and Writings of Ovid, 1-5; Scansion, 6-15; Text, 17-190; Met. 1.89-150, 244-312, 313-415, 2.1-328, 680-707, 760-796, 3.1-137, 4.55-166, 662-763, 770-787, 5.341-445, 462-538, 564-567, 6.146-312, 339-382, 7.1-158, 8.183-235, 610-715, 9.101-272, 10.1-77, 162-219, 11.194-220, 12.39-63, 13.749-896, 15.871-879, Selections from *Fasti*, *Heroides*, *Amores*, and *Tristia* (110-141), Passages for Sight-Reading, 141-190 <mostly from the *Metamorphoses*, with notes at the foot of the page>; Notes, 191-302; Word-Groups, 303-322; Vocabulary, 323-461.

Gleason, Clarence W. *A Term of Ovid: Ten Stories from the Metamorphoses for Boys and Girls*. (New York, American Book Company, 1900).

Contents: Text, 9-84 <the captions are Mr. Gleason's>; *Atalanta's Last Race*, *Pyramus and Thisbe*, *Apollo's Unrequited Love for Daphne*, *How Phaëthon Drove his Father's Chariot*, *The Death of Orpheus*, *The Touch of Gold*, *Philemon and Baucis*, *The Impiety and Punishment of Niobe*, *The Flood*, *Perseus and Andromeda*; Notes, 87-133 (Ovid's Life and Works are treated on pages 87-89); Helps to Scansion, 134-138 (General Observations, 134-135, Special Notes on Irregularities Occurring in the Lines Contained in the Text, 135-138); Vocabulary, 139-209.

There is no hint in the book of the parts of the *Metamorphoses* from which the selections are taken. The 1421 lines are numbered continuously, and are so referred to throughout the notes. The first 100 lines are divided into feet for scansion; accent marks are set where the ictus should be placed in each verse, and the position of the caesura is indicated. For 200 lines more, the verses are marked off in feet for scansion, and

the place of the caesura is indicated; the ictus, however, is not represented by an accent. For another 48 lines only the place of the caesura is indicated. In these 348 verses, every vowel that is to be elided is written above the ordinary line, and in a smaller type; the same is done with every instance of final *m*, when that letter with a preceding vowel is to be elided. Finally, it may be noted that, for the first three selections, the ordinary Latin prose-order is given below the text of Ovid itself; below this are given synonyms for the more unusual words in Ovid's text, or for words in that text which show some special poetic use.

Kelsey, Francis W. *Selections from Ovid*. (Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1891).

Contents: Ovid and his Works, 1-14; The Greek and the Roman Mythology, 15-49; Text, 51-158: *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, *Fasti*, *Remedia Amoris*, *Tristia*, *Epistulae ex Ponto*, *Ibis*, *Met.* 1.1-421, 2.1-400 (with many verses omitted), 684-707, 760-782, 3.6-137 (with some verses omitted), 597-691, 4.55-165, 432-462, 6.614-764 (with some verses omitted), 5.385-571 (with some verses omitted), 6.155-312 (with some verses omitted), 8.183-235, 620-724 (with some verses omitted), 10.1-77 (with some verses omitted), 162-219, 11.90-143, 592-615, 12.39-63, 14.805-828, 15.60-172 (with many verses omitted), 746-851 (with some verses omitted), 871-879; Notes, 161-293; <Bibliographical> Helps to the Study of Ovid, 295-298; Vocabulary, 3-142.

Knapp, Charles. *Selections from the Metamorphoses of Ovid*. (To be published soon, Scott, Foresman, and Company, Chicago, 1922).

Contents: Introduction; Text: *Met.* 3.1-137, 4.55-166, 663-764, 6.165-312, 8.183-235, 10.1-77, 11.85-145; Vocabulary.

This edition will be published soon, at first as a separate pamphlet; later, it is to be incorporated in the author's edition of the *Aeneid*.

Laing, Gordon J. *Selections from Ovid*. (D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1905).

Contents: Life and Works of Ovid, xi-xix; The Augustan Age, xix-xxv; Greek Mythology, xxvi-xxxv; Roman Religion, xxxv-xxxvii; Prosody, xxxviii-xliii; The *Metamorphoses*, 1-7; Text, with English summaries interspersed, 7-153; *Met.* 1.253-415, 452-567, 2.1-366, 833-875, 3.1-250, 359-399, 4.55-166, 631-764, 5.341-571, 6.146-312, 7.1-158, 8.183-259, 10.1-77, 143-219, 560-680, 11.85-145, 12.1-145, 580-619, 13.623-729, 14.527-608, 772-851, 15.745-879, *Selections from Heroides*, *Fasti*, *Tristia*, *Epistulae Ex Ponto* (123-153); Notes, 157-261; Vocabulary, 265-358.

Miller, Frank Justus. *Ovid: Selected Works*. (New York, American Book Company, 1900).

Contents: Text, 11-225: *Selections from Tristia*, *Heroides*, *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, *Remedia Amoris*, *Fasti*, *Met.* 1. complete, 2.1-328, 3.1-137, 402-510, 4.55-166, 432-480, 663-752, 5.177-235, 341-437, 462-532, 572-641, 662-678, 6.146-312, 7.1-293, 8.183-258, 611-724, 9.1-97, 134-210, 229-272, 10.1-63, 11.102-193,

12.1-38, 580-628, 13.1-398, 429-480, 750-897, 15.143-236, 453-478, 745-879; *The Poetic Form of Ovid's Works*, 227-242 (a discussion of Ovid's verse); Notes, 243-416; Vocabulary, 417-528.

IV. ANNOTATED EDITIONS OF OTHER WORKS OF OVID

It has been well said that the best way to review the parts of an author already read is to read some other part of that same author's work. On that principle, an excellent way of studying the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid is to study his other works—at least by way of supplement or complement. I am putting down here, therefore, the names of some convenient editions that deal with other works of Ovid, or with them and with parts of the *Metamorphoses* itself.

Bailey, Cyril. P. *Ovidii Nasonis Fastorum Liber III*. (Oxford, University Press, 1921). Pp. 141.

The introduction deals with the *Fasti* and the Study of Roman Religion, 7-24, *The Roman Calendar*, 25-33, Mars, 33-47.

Edwards, G. M. *Phaethon and Other Stories from Ovid*. (Cambridge, University Press, 1909). Pp. xxviii+132.

The stories have the following titles: The Golden Age, The Deluge, Phaethon, Proserpine, Arion, Niobe (very briefly given), Orpheus and Eurydice, Daedalus and Icarus, Perdix, Ariadne to Theseus, Perseus (very briefly given: the selection does not include the Andromeda story), Narcissus, Iphigenia, The Fall of Troy, Penelope to Ulysses, The Cyclops. There are also selections from the elegiac poems.

Freeman, C. E. *Selections from Ovid*. (Oxford, University Press, 1917). Pp. 128.

The selections in this volume are mostly from the elegiac poems.

Hallam, G. H. *The Fasti of Ovid*. (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1893). Pp. xxix+352.

The book covers all of the *Fasti*.

Johnson, B. H., and Firth, R. B. *Easy Stories from the Metamorphoses*. (Longmans, Green, and Company, London and New York, 1914). Pp. xix+58.

——— *Stories from the Metamorphoses*. (Longmans, Green and Company, London and New York, 1914). Pp. xix+57.

For these Volumes see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY II. 41 (November 12, 1917).

Palmer, Arthur. *Heroides* (Oxford, University Press, 1898). Pp. lx+542.

Pearce, J. W. F. *Ovid: Elegiac Poems*. 3 Volumes. (Oxford, University Press, 1914). Pp. xxviii+210; xxxiv+206; xxviii+182.

Volume I contains *The Earlier Poems*; Volume II contains *The Roman Calendar* (Selections from the *Fasti*); Volume III contains *Letters from Exile*. For these volumes see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY II. 33-34 (October 29, 1917).

Strangeways, L. R. *Elegiaca* (Oxford, University Press, 1915). Pp. 74.

On this book see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 11.33.

V. TRANSLATIONS

I shall mention only the translations of Ovid that have appeared in the Loeb Classical Library.

Showerman, Grant. *Ovid: Heroides and Amores* (1914).

Miller, Frank Justus. *Ovid: Metamorphoses*. 2 volumes (1916).

Volume 1 contains the translation of Books 1-8, Volume 2 that of Books 9-15. On this translation see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 12.58.

The Loeb Classical Library is handled in the United States by Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York City.

VI. THE PLACE OF OVID IN THE LATIN COURSE

Teachers who are interested now in a discussion of the proper place of Ovid in the High School Latin course may be glad to know that the subject was discussed by Professor Charles E. Bennett, in the book which, in conjunction with Professor George P. Bristol, he published under the title *The Teaching of Latin and Greek in the Secondary School*² (Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1911). See page 124.

To a volume entitled *Principles of Secondary Education*, edited by Professor Paul Monroe, of Teachers College (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914), Professor Gonzalez Lodge contributed an article on *The Teaching of Latin* (pages 387-405). For his discussion of Ovid, see page 403.

(To be concluded)

C.K.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN SENECA

At first sight it would seem that in treating the problem of evil in the world Seneca is an orthodox Stoic. Indeed a Roman philosopher could scarcely be expected to advance any new solution of a metaphysical problem which the keenest minds of the Stoics school had already faced with such adroitness. Moreover, if Seneca adopts the explanations of the Stoic for this difficult question, he may claim at least as much originality as more modern and abler thinkers, who often, consciously or unconsciously, repeat or rework the arguments of the Stoics in their attempt to solve the riddle of evil in the universe. Certainly to no other persistent problem of philosophy or religion can the words of Terence be more truly applied (*Eunuchus*, Prologue 41): *Nullumst iam dictum quod non sit dictum prius*.

Any religious system which emphasizes the ultimate goodness of the world finds itself put on the defensive when it is obliged to reconcile this goodness with the obvious existence of evil, be it physical or moral. Inevitably, then, the Stoics, with their idealistic conception of the universe, are hard pressed to explain the ways of God to man.

For the existence of physical evils the Stoics have, in general, three explanations to offer.¹ It is natural,

of course, that the Stoics should say that physical evils are not evils in themselves, since they belong to the class of *indifferentia*—things indifferent. This is the point of view of all the Stoics from Zeno and Chrysippus to Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, and it finds its Christian analogy in many passages of the New Testament.

Again, the Stoics stress the practical value of physical suffering. War may appear to be deplorable, but is it not an advantage in an overpopulated world? Similarly, Seneca maintains that the amputation of a limb may benefit the body as a whole (*De Providentia* 3.2). Even to-day there are those who assert that physical evils are 'teleologically necessary', that floods teach us how to build dikes, and that disease has produced the art of medicine and the science of the body and of life (compare Friedrich Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, 323-324 [New York, 1900]).

Finally, the Stoics extol the beneficial effect of physical evil as discipline, and this argument, of course, applies also to moral evil. Seneca, especially, praises the advantages of evil as a test of character. A brilliant expression of this thought is found in the epigram of *Epistle* 110.3: *Adhibe diligentiam tuam et intueere quid sint res nostrae, non quid vocentur, et scies plura mala contingere nobis quam accidere*. The famous passage, *Hebrews* 12.6, 'For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth', has its pagan parallel in Seneca, *De Providentia* 4.7: *Hos itaque deus quos probat, quos amat indurat, recognoscit, exercet*.

The punishment of the wicked is occasionally spoken of as a warning for others. Seneca actually appears to have what is for a philosopher before the Christian era an unusual conception of vicarious suffering. God, he says (*De Providentia* 6.3), may cause the just to suffer that they may serve as noble examples for other men.

The Stoics are similarly skilful in explaining moral evil. Good and evil, they say, are relative. How could we know good if there were no evil by way of contrast? *Nulli vitium est*, observes Seneca (*Epp.* 124.19), *nisi cui virtus potest esse*.

Evil thus becomes a guarantee against a morally colorless and therefore characterless universe. The Stoic reasoning here is both ancient and modern, for Socrates in Plato (*Theaetetus* 176 A) maintains that there must always be in the world an element which is antagonistic to good, and John Fiske¹ argues that without an element of antagonism there could be no consciousness and therefore no world.

But the Stoics are fertile in invention, and have other solutions of the problem. Following closely in the footsteps of Plato, they declare that everything, in spite of the apparent evil in the world, makes for the good of the whole. Several passages in Seneca are of similar content². In substance, this is the explanation which evolutionists are forced to give, and, unsatisfying as it is from the point of view of the individual, it is a commonplace of philosophy. The

¹Through Nature to God, 35-36 (New York, 1899).

²*Epp.* 74.20; *De Vita Beata* 15.7; *De Providentia* 1.3.1.

Stoics insist that no vicious man receives real advantages. Seneca, as well as Socrates, seems more inclined to assert that no virtuous man can suffer real affliction, and he explains the prosperity of the wicked as their inevitable share in the blessings prepared for the good³.

Finally, the Stoics argue that evil must of necessity exist in the world, notwithstanding the desire of God for a morally perfect universe. Their statements on this point leave much to be desired in the way of clearness and definiteness, but apparently they had in mind an argument like that which is advanced with greater lucidity by an English philosopher of the seventeenth century⁴.

For though the names of things may be changed by anyone at pleasure, as that a square may be called a circle. . . yet that the nature of a square should not be necessarily what it is, but be arbitrarily convertible into the nature of a circle. . . this doth most plainly imply a contradiction, and the compossibility of contradictions destroys all knowledge and the definite natures or notions of things. . . And the reason is the same for all other things, as just and unjust; for everything is what it is immutably by the necessity of its own nature. . . Essences and verities of things are independent upon the will of God.

In the same strain writes Seneca, *De Beneficiis* 2.29.3: *Quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit*. Seneca, however, has another reason to give for the presence of moral evil in the world, and here he begins to show an important reaction against orthodox Stoicism (*De Providentia* 5.9): *Non potest artifex mutare materiam*. In other words, Seneca ascribes much of the evil in the world to the nature of matter itself. The advantage of this theory obviously is that, although it limits the power of God, it retains His goodness. The Stoics indeed believe in the goodness of God, and Cleanthes's Hymn to Zeus shows their characteristic attitude:

For nought is done on earth apart from thee,
Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea,
Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men,
Whose own hearts lead them to perversity⁵.

But the Stoics, who make matter the substratum of all existence, could not think of it as inherently evil, in view of their teleological conception of the universe.

Quite in keeping, however, with the different point of view of Seneca are his disparaging comments on *corpus*, 'matter'. In general, Seneca's attitude toward matter is Orphic and Platonic. Plato, for instance, often speaks of the body as the grave or the prison of the soul⁶. At times the language of Seneca is similarly mystical: *Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est* (Epp. 65.16), and *Nunc solutus sum? ad hoc me natura grave corporis mei pondus adstrinxit* (Epp. 24.17). If we did not know the Latin source of these two passages, they might easily be regarded as Platonic in origin. In other passages Seneca speaks of the body as the prison of the soul (*De Beneficiis* 3.20.1; Epp.

102.22). Plato frequently emphasizes the inferior quality of matter (compare *Phaedo* 66-67, 79-81), and Seneca writes in the same vein (Epp. 65.22, 92.13, 14.2, 65.24; *Ad Marciam* 24.5).

Seneca, accordingly, is deeply impressed with the imperfect nature of matter. He realizes that there is on the material side of human nature an almost irresistible tendency to be vicious, and here he departs noticeably from Stoic ways of thinking, and allies himself with the Orphic and Platonic schools. In Seneca we find the idea that man has a sinless soul enchained in a sinful body. Seneca, however, does not follow the Orphic theory of prenatal sin, but he is in accord with Stoic and Platonic teachings in his belief that man at birth is free from the taint of sin (Epp. 22.15, 94.31, 94.55-56). He is a strong supporter of the doctrine of the original innocence of the soul as opposed to the sinful body. Seneca further believes that all men have the capacity for virtue (Epp. 108.8; *De Beneficiis* 3.18.2).

But Seneca is convinced that it is easier for human nature to become perverted than to become perfect. Whereas Cleanthes affirms that all men have natural impulses toward virtue⁷, and Chrysippus speaks in a similar manner⁸, the tone of Seneca is strikingly different. According to him, the soul of man is *ad falsa proclivis* (Epp. 94.13). Even more dismal are other utterances⁹. Seneca, in a word, is extremely pessimistic about human nature. *Tota flebilis vita est*¹⁰, is his consistent attitude, intelligible enough, indeed, in a philosopher so closely associated with the social and political life of Nero's reign. It is his firm conviction that mankind always has been vicious, is vicious, and always will be vicious. The Stoics make very hard and fast the lines of cleavage between the *sapiens* and the *stultus*, but they do not stress the inevitability of human error to the extent that Seneca does.

Both the cause and the effect of this conviction of Seneca are important. The cause, as already pointed out, *non potest artifex mutare materiam*, involves a modification of the Stoic conception of matter. The effect is that it influences strongly Seneca's idea of virtue. Given human beings from the start so pre-disposed to moral frailty, the attainment of virtue becomes a tremendous achievement, the result of a long and constant struggle. Seneca frequently speaks of life in military metaphors as a battle.

Virtue, therefore, in Seneca assumes a progressive character. The older Stoics, on the other hand, are chiefly interested in the end of this progress, to wit, the instantaneous and unconscious attainment of virtue. In one astonishing passage (Epp. 89.8) Seneca actually announces that this struggle against vice, this progress toward virtue, is virtue itself: *ad virtutem venit per ipsam*. Seneca thus substitutes a process of becoming virtuous for the static virtue of the older Stoics. Often, when Seneca refers to the

³*De Beneficiis* 4.28.1.

⁴Ralph Cudworth, *Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, 32-33 (London, 1731).

⁵Verses 17-20, translated by W. H. Porter.

⁶Compare *Cratylus* 400 B-C, *Phaedo* 82-83.

⁷J. Von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 1.556 (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.65.7 W [Leipzig, Teubner, 3 volumes, 1903-1905]).

⁸Von Arnim 3.214 (*Anecdota Graeca* Paris, edited by Cramer, 1.171).

⁹Epp. 22.15, 42.1-2, 53.8; *De Ira* 2.28.1, 2.8.1, 2.31.8, 3.26.4.

¹⁰*Ad Marciam* 11.1.

sapiens, he seems to mean simply the man who has advanced far on the road to virtue, but has not yet attained the goal of perfection. In one passage (Epp. 42.1), he actually defines the *vir bonus* as a man of second grade.

Seneca thus gives us an apotheosis of man's struggle with himself. Professor Hicks comments¹¹ on the important passage in Seneca, *ad virtutem venit per ipsam*, but does not realize its significance. He says that it would be an error to suppose that this idea of making progress was an innovation, which is perfectly true. The passages, however, which he quotes from Stoic philosophers refer simply to progress in virtue, but give no moral value to the state of progression. Zeno speaks of dreams as a criterion for progress, and the idea is probably not foreign to Cleanthes. But Zeno explicitly states that the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus, and so, too, he who commits a major sin, and he who commits a minor are both equally not in the right path¹².

Seneca never draws such dogmatic distinctions between the *stultus* and the *sapiens*. He recognizes numerous degrees of progression from vice to virtue (Epp. 75.8, 72.6 ff.), and defines clearly the difference between the man who is still making progress and the man who has attained perfect wisdom (Epp. 35.4, 72.6). But Seneca's glorification of the struggle of attaining virtue to the extent of calling it virtue is an extraordinary departure from orthodox Stoicism.

Seneca believes that this progress is not merely not vice or unhappiness, but virtue itself. And the reason for his belief is that he thinks human nature has vicious tendencies so strong that even incomplete victory over them deserves the name of virtue. Although, as has been said, he maintains that man is guiltless at birth, still perfection or semiperfection must be won by mighty efforts against tremendous odds, and man can, in a sense, return to nature a better soul (i. e. one more strongly fortified against vice) than he received from her at birth (De Tranquillitate 11.3).

The practical result of this attitude of Seneca is that he gives us an even nobler conception of human character than the earlier Stoics gave. It is difficult to see how a finer ideal of human personality could be created. Seneca counts as more happy the man who has had nothing to overcome, but he regards the man who has fought his way to freedom as deserving better of himself (Epp. 52.6). When they are considered from this point of view, his pessimistic utterances in regard to the weakness of human nature become tinged with a kind of optimism. Certainly his tolerance of sin seems not so much a weak compromise between Stoic theory and human practice as a sympathetic understanding of the struggle between the body and the spirit. By reason of this desperate struggle against his physical self, man may surpass even God (De Providentia 6.6; Epp. 53.11). The older Stoics say

merely that good men are in nothing exceeded by Jupiter.

Seneca, therefore, repeats many of the explanations of the older Stoics in regard to the universe, but, when he does so, he often seems to be speaking merely *ex cathedra* as an expounder of Stoic theory. Actually he is convinced that the innumerable evils of the world are at least partly ascribable to the imperfect nature of matter. Whereas the older Stoics endow man with impulses toward virtue, Seneca believes that man's tendencies toward vice are stronger. Although he does not engage in any metaphysical discussion as to why is it easier for human nature to become vicious than to become virtuous, he evidently feels that it is a flaw in the composition of matter which is responsible. For humanity, then, the task is the achievement of virtue under the strain of this initial handicap.

In his belief that man has a sinless soul in a sinful body, Seneca takes his stand with the Orphic and Platonic schools. He breaks away, however, from the Orphics in his denial of prenatal sin, and in his insistence upon the original innocence of the soul. Seneca also affirms that all men are endowed with potentialities for virtue. His pessimistic conviction that human nature must ever be frail and sinful is due to his realization of the difficulties of attaining perfection with the body eternally at odds with the spirit.

So it is that he comes to the astonishing conclusion that progress toward virtue is in a sense virtue itself, and he admits that, for all practical purposes, the *vir bonus* is a man of second grade. His position here is not weakly compromising, but the common-sense attitude of a man who appreciates the intensity of the struggle between body and spirit by means of which man may surpass even God.

To the statements of Seneca quoted in this paper other passages apparently and perhaps actually contradictory may be found. Robert Southey once wrote in a letter to Walter Savage Landor, "Landor, I am not a Stoic at home". Often, to say nothing of being a Stoic at home, Seneca seems to have been a consistent philosopher neither at home nor abroad. It would be futile to search the pages of Seneca for any systematic exposition of the problem of evil. He does not claim to be a metaphysician. But, if Seneca does not reflect systematically, he at least reflects seriously on a question that is as old as the world. In fact, his conclusions seem to have influenced to a considerable degree his philosophy of life in general.

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EVELYN SPRING

REVIEWS

Plato's Studies and Criticisms of the Poets. By Carleton L. Brownson. Boston: Richard C. Badger (1920). Pp. 159.

Georgius Gemistus Pletho's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle. By John Wilson Taylor. University of Chicago Dissertation (1921). Pp. vii + 100.

¹¹R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, 89 (New York, 1910).

¹²Compare Diogenes Laertius 7.120; Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis* 8.1061 F, 9.1062 B.

Vorwort und Einleitung zur Gesamtausgabe von Platons Dialogen. By Otto Apelt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner (1920). Pp. XLVIII.

Platons Dialoge, Uebersetzt und Erläutert (Apologie und Kriton: Pp. 108; Timaios, Kritias: Pp. 224). By Otto Apelt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner (1919).

One of the most eloquent tributes to the vitality of Platonism is the stream of publications, different in scope, but united in their conviction that the work of Plato is still of fundamental value for modern thought. Exegesis is indeed worth while only in the case of authors that are themselves of considerable intrinsic value.

Some years ago Professor Brownson published a useful article, entitled *Reasons for Plato's Hostility to the Poets*, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 28 [1897], 5-41, in which he analyzed some of the motives which led the most poetic of philosophers to attack the poets. In the present work he returns to the theme and treats it more fully. In the first part (13-73) he presents an impressive array of evidence for Plato's wide acquaintance with Greek poetry, supported by valuable tables that indicate the distribution of Plato's quotations, and gives adequate reasons for his use of them. The second part (77-154) is devoted to an attempt to account for Plato's usual distrust of poetry, and considers several phases of the "ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy". Naturally, much of the discussion is given to the place of poetry in Greek education and to the criticisms of its ethical value by various Greeks and by Plato himself; and some consideration, though hardly a sufficiently exhaustive consideration, is given to the relation of Plato's attitude toward poetry to his general philosophical position. There is an outward inconsistency, as Professor Brownson rightly observes, between the criticism of poetry in Book 10 of the *Republic* and the criticism in Books 2 and 3; as he says (90), "Plato here <in Book 10> goes beyond the truth when he asserts that the previous argument . . . prescribed the absolute exclusion of mimetic poetry from the state". Professor Brownson thinks that "this fact has never been remarked"; perhaps I may be allowed to refer to my discussion of this very point (in *Plato's View of Poetry*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 29 [1918], especially 50 ff.). The difference in Plato's attitude can be explained, I think, by a careful study of the intervening discussion of the Theory of Ideas, and of Plato's tendency to regard the Ideas as necessary hypotheses, not as palpable realities. This, in turn, involves a consideration of the opposing methods of intuition and logic among the Greeks, which are reflected in many of Plato's dialogues. Such an approach would trace to their logical conclusion Plato's successive attempts to give the poets their due, yet no more than their due. And what is the conclusion? Not quite, I think, the conclusion that Professor Brownson, like most readers of Plato, draws from *Republic* 10, that "Plato banishes epic and drama utterly from his *Republic*" (144). For we should reckon also with Plato's literary method, which is not easily susceptible

to appeals to passages shorn of their dramatic context or taken without regard for their possibly comic intent. In *Republic* 10 Plato contrasts the existing state of poetry with an ideal of philosophy that he has admitted to be in practice unattainable; this is not so much sober and final criticism as a passing thrust at the dangerous rivals of philosophy. Plato is elsewhere (for example in the *Phaedrus*) willing enough to justify poetry so far as it can be made to accord with his Theory of Ideas. And, as Professor Brownson well says (153),

. . . we cannot deny him on account of the words which he employs against the poets the adequate appreciation of their art which he proves both by the poetic beauty of his dialogues and by his sympathetic and understanding allusions to poetry and the poets.

Between Plato's explicit criticisms of the poets and the love of them that is to be read between the lines, Professor Brownson has found the materials for a highly interesting book; and, on page 154, he has amply

shown that <Plato's> hostility to poetry is due to many good reasons and that the arguments which he employs against the poets have more real weight than has usually been ascribed to them.

Few figures in the history of Platonism have failed more conspicuously to receive the study that they deserve than Gemistus Pletho. Both because his was the honor of being the first to deliver an effective attack on the ancient defensive and offensive alliance between Christian theology and Aristotelian metaphysics, and to draw the attention of Western scholars to the independent value of Platonism, and because of his own worth, Pletho is a thinker who can not be lightly passed over. Professor Taylor provides a careful account of Pletho's controversy with Gennadius and the polemics of other scholars to which it gave rise; this is of interest for the history of philosophy. Furthermore, his lucid exposition of the way in which Pletho refuted Aristotle's perverse criticism of Plato's thought and exhibited his occasional inconsistencies is of great value for an understanding both of Platonism and of Aristotelianism. We have been so often told that Aristotle's criticism of Plato is destructive and final that we should welcome this counter-blast; and Aristotle's deserved reputation is great enough to dispense with any meretricious glamor. The effect of Professor Taylor's study, in its analysis of Pletho's successive criticisms, is cumulative, and is therefore hardly capable of being summarized here; but students of Plato and of Aristotle will do well to examine his discussion of fundamental metaphysical notions: universal and particular, causes, teleology, freedom of the will, and immortality (38 ff.). Pletho's own contribution to ethics, based mainly on Platonic and Stoic traditions, has been discussed by Professor Taylor in a separate paper, *Gemistus Pletho as a Moral Philosopher* (*Transactions of the American Philological Association* 51 [1920], 84-100). The work under review provides, incidentally, some testimony in support of the "unity of Plato's thought".

A dozen years ago Otto Apelt projected a German translation and edition of the Theaetetus of Plato. The project grew, thanks to the suggestion and co-operation of others (including K. Hildebrandt, C. Ritter, and G. Schneider), till a translation and edition of all Plato's works is now practically completed. The translation, consciously revolting against the virtuosity of Schleiermacher's Hellenisms, tries to render faithfully the sense of the original in the idiom of modern German; the volumes that have come to my notice seem to indicate that the translators have been fairly successful in this attempt. Each dialogue is accompanied by a brief introduction and a commentary, and by an index and a useful bibliography. The general introduction, by Apelt, summarizes in forty-eight pages the various phases of Plato's philosophy and sketches the course of Platonism down to modern times. The purpose of the whole work, as he explains, is to acquaint modern readers with the vast importance of Plato for our times—surely a praiseworthy purpose. To novices I fear that his introduction will convey little enlightenment, for it assumes a considerable grasp of the subject; and veterans will find little that is novel. But there are doubtless some to whom it is adapted; and it is both sensible and readable.

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WILLIAM CHASE GREENE

A Study of Vergil's Descriptions of Nature. By Mabel Louise Anderson. Boston: Richard G. Badger (1916). Pp. 224.

The statistical commentator we have always with us; here is another attempt to arrive by analysis and computation at the secrets of a great poet's art. The writer says in her Introduction:

It is difficult to discuss poetic descriptions both sympathetically and judicially. It is equally difficult to analyze the technique of any artistic production without entailing the loss of its beauty. But, inasmuch as all artistic, technical principles have been formulated through such minute analysis, it has not seemed inappropriate to examine these principles of artistry which Vergil followed, consciously or unconsciously, in his descriptions of nature.

In studying these descriptive passages it has been thought best to classify and study them under two main groupings.

I. The Static descriptions in which the local point of view does not change.

II. The Active descriptions in which the local point of view constantly changes.

These main divisions may be subdivided into:

(a) The formal description for which the poet has set aside his narrative.

(b) The incidental description which has crept into the work without intention, and which is so short that it does not interrupt the narrative.

Then follows an orgy of statistics, divided into groups and neatly arranged in parallel columns, with a few pages of introductory matter before each set. First we have a number of pages of analysis of what the author calls "mood sketches" (14-71). These are classified under the rubrics of point of view (personal, local, temporal); the center; the outline; the mood.

Then comes a long chapter on sense appeals (72-213), where the descriptions are catalogued each under the sense invoked. So we learn that there are in Vergil thirty-eight appeals to form; two hundred and sixty-six appeals to light and shade; six hundred and fifteen to the sense of sight; ninety-eight to the sense of touch; forty-eight to taste; twenty-eight to smell; two hundred and fifty-six to hearing, etc., etc. Nothing seems to have escaped. But one is tempted to ask, after looking through this imposing list, "Well, what of it?"

The publisher's announcement on the jacket of the book says: "The work will no doubt interest students of psychology and general modern literature quite as much as it will interest students of the classics". This may very well be true, since to the psychologist who has mistaken all learning to be his province anything is of interest. Consider, for instance, that there are in Vergil twenty-nine references to heat, while there are fifty-six references to cold (I take Miss Anderson's word for this on page 166; I have not checked up any of her mathematical calculations). What gloomy tale of repressions, inhibitions, and complexes might not the facile psychologist construct from this obvious disparity!

It is doubtful whether any one will ever discover what porridge fed John Keats; it is equally doubtful whether all this use of the measuring-tool will help to a better understanding of a poet who is above all a sensitive and elusive soul. One might commend Miss Anderson for her industry, but one can scarcely congratulate her on the results of it.

UNION COLLEGE

HARRISON CADWALLADER COFFIN

CLASSICAL ARTICLES IN NON-CLASSICAL PERIODICALS

II

(Concluded from page 48)

Contemporary Review—Sept., 1921, The Future of the Classics [a discussion of the Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on the Position of the Classics in British Education].

Historical Outlook—Jan., Feb., Reference Study in Oriental and Early European History (to 1700), William R. Lingo [the article gives references to many books dealing with Greek and Roman History. The author "makes no attempt to judge the merits of the books or references, or to distinguish between the references better adapted to the needs of the teacher as against those better suited to the needs of the student". No information is given concerning places or dates of publication. Of course, then, no distinction is made between different editions of the same book].—Oct., Another Shot at Mr. Wells, Lynn Thorndike.

Historische Zeitschrift—CXXV, 2, Nikias und Xenophon von Kos: Zwei Charakterköpfe aus der Griechisch-Römischen Geschichte, R. Herzog.

- History—July, The Origin of the Punic Wars, M. Cary.
- Jahrbücher für National Ökonomie und Statistik—Jan., Ein Patentgesetz aus dem Griechischen Altertum, C. Cichorius.
- Journal of the American Medical Association—Aug. 5, The Real Things in Medicine, Hubert A. Royster, M. D. [contains a tribute to Greek].
- Journal of Education and School World (London)—Sept., 1921, The Classics in Education [deals with the Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on the Position of the Classics in the Educational System of Great Britain].
- Journal of the New York State Teachers' Association—Jan., Some Problems in the First Two Years of Latin, S. Dwight Arms [a discussion of the New York State Syllabus in Latin for the first two years].—March, The Laboratory Method in the Teaching of Beginners, Rollin H. Tanner.
- Metropolitan Museum of Art, Bulletin of—Feb., Classical Accessions. V. Roman Marbles, M.E.C. [illustrated].—March, Cretan Reproductions, G. M. A. R. (ichter) [one illustration]; A New Fragment of the Archaic Stele.—April, Important Loan of Cretan Antiquities, G. M. A. R. [illustrated].—May, Classical Accessions. VI. Greek Terracottas, M.E.C.—June, Hellenistic Silverware, G.M.A.R. [illustrated].—July, An Archaic Greek Head, G.M. A.R.—Sept., Engraved Gems, G.M.A.R. [illustrated].—Oct., A Klazomenian Sarcophagus, G.M. A.R. [illustrated].
- Michigan Law Review—June, Some Greek Legal Papyri from the Michigan Collection, A. E. R. Boak.
- Michigan Schoolmaster's Club, Journal of the, 55th Meeting, 1920.—The Place of Latin in the Reorganized Secondary School, Edwin L. Miller.
- National Geographic Magazine—June, Capri, The Island Retreat of Roman Emperors, Morgan Heiskell [12 special engravings with brief letter-press under each]; The Splendor of Rome, Florence Craig Albrecht.
- New International Year Book for 1921—Archaeology, Oliver S. Tonks [pages 50-51]; Philology, Classical, Charles Knapp [pages 552-559].
- New York Times Book Review and Magazine—July 10, The Legacy of Greece, R. W. Livingstone, and Report of the Committee to Inquire Into the Position of the Classics in the Educational System of the United Kingdom, reviewed by Brander Matthews.
- The Nineteenth Century—Dec., 1921, Greek in Extremis [this article discusses the status of Greek in the Universities and the Secondary Schools, and contains a plea also for the Classics].
- Nuova Antologia—March 1, Etruria e Roma, B. Nogara.
- Open Court—July, Virgil's Conception of Fate, Arthur L. Keith.
- Phi Beta Kappa Key—March, A Return to the Classics, Nicholas Murray Butler; Lucretius in Praise of Epicurus, Charles Knapp [translations of Lucretius's great tributes to Epicurus].
- Romanic Review—Oct.-Dec., 1921, When Did Latin Cease to be a Spoken Language in France?, Henri F. Muller.
- St. Nicholas—April, A Live Latin Club.
- The School Review—Jan., The Relation of Latin Study to Ability in English Vocabulary and Composition, Alvah Talbot Otis.—April, The Classics as Cultural Studies, T. Valentine Parker; Selected Articles on the Study of Latin and Greek, Lamar Beman, reviewed by Shirley Hamrin.
- School and Society—Jan. 28, Latin as a Modern International Language [quotations from a report of a Committee of the American Philological Association, made at the meeting held in December, 1921, on Latin as an international language "which will satisfy the intellectual and esthetic demands of educated people in every land"].
- Sewanee Review—Jan.-March, Seneca the Philosopher, R. B. Steele.
- South Atlantic Quarterly—Jan., The Dido Episode, Arthur L. Keith.
- Studies in Philology (University of North Carolina)—July, Old English Causative verbs, James Finch Royster [of some value to the classicist, too].
- University of California Chronicle—April, The Unity of Homer, John A. Scott, reviewed by Walter Leaf.
- University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, VII, 2—May, 1921, The Sepulchre of Christ in Art and Liturgy, with Special Reference to the Liturgic Drama, Neil C. Brooks.
- University of North Dakota, Quarterly Journal—Jan., The Ancient Classics, Thomas F. Kane.

C. K.

THE NEW YORK CLASSICAL CLUB SCHOLARSHIP AWARDS

Thirty-eight candidates from thirteen of the New York City High Schools competed for the Latin and Greek scholarships awarded by the New York Classical Club, at its eighth prize examination, on Saturday, June 17. Winifred Ruter, of Hunter College High School, won the \$150 Latin scholarship; honorable mention was given to Aaron Grossman, of De Witt Clinton High School, and to Minnie Feuer, of Hunter College High School. The Greek scholarship, \$75, went to Henry Antipolsky, of Eastern District High School; honorable mention was won by Charles Steinberg, of the same School.

HARWOOD HOADLEY, *Chairman,*
Committee on Award of Scholarships